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Abstract
We discuss views about whether the universe can be rationally com-
prehended, starting with Plato, then Leibniz, and then the views of some
distinguished scientists of the previous century. Based on this, we defend
the thesis that comprehension is compression, i.e., explaining many facts
using few theoretical assumptions, and that a theory may be viewed as a
computer program for calculating observations. This provides motivation
for defining the complexity of something to be the size of the simplest
theory for it, in other words, the size of the smallest program for calculat-
ing it. This is the central idea of algorithmic information theory (AIT),
a field of theoretical computer science. Using the mathematical concept
of program-size complexity, we exhibit irreducible mathematical facts,
mathematical facts that cannot be demonstrated using any mathematical
theory simpler than they are. It follows that the world of mathematical
ideas has infinite complexity and is therefore not fully comprehensible,
at least not in a static fashion. Whether the physical world has finite or
infinite complexity remains to be seen. Current science believes that the
world contains randomness, and is therefore also infinitely complex, but a
deterministic universe that simulates randomness via pseudo-randomness
is also a possibility, at least according to recent highly speculative work of
S. Wolfram. [Written for a meeting of the German Philosophical Society,
Bonn, September 2002.]
“Nature uses only the longest threads to weave her patterns, so that each small piece of
her fabric reveals the organization of the entire tapestry.”
—Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, 1965, at the very end of Chapter 1, “The
Law of Gravitation”.1
“The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible.”
—Attributed to Einstein. The original source, where the wording is somewhat differ-
ent, is Einstein, “Physics and Reality”, 1936, reprinted in Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, 1954.2
1An updated version of this chapter would no doubt include a discussion of the infamous
astronomical missing mass problem.
2Einstein actually wrote “Das ewig Unbegreifliche an der Welt ist ihre Begreiflichkeit”.
Translated word for word, this is “The eternally incomprehensible about the world is its
comprehensibility”. But I prefer the version given above, which emphasizes the paradox.
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It’s a great pleasure for me to speak at this meeting of the German Philo-
sophical Society. Perhaps it’s not generally known that at the end of his life my
predecessor Kurt Go¨del was obsessed with Leibniz.3 Writing this paper was for
me a voyage of discovery—of the depth of Leibniz’s thought! Leibniz’s power
as a philosopher is informed by his genius as a mathematician; as I’ll explain,
some of the key ideas of AIT are clearly visible in embryonic form in his 1686
Discourse on Metaphysics.
I Plato’s Timaeus—The Universe is Intelligible.
Origins of the Notion of Simplicity: Simplicity
as Symmetry [Brisson, Meyerstein 1991]
“[T]his is the central idea developed in the Timaeus: the order established by the demiurge
in the universe becomes manifest as the symmetry found at its most fundamental level, a
symmetry which makes possible a mathematical description of such a universe.”
—Brisson, Meyerstein, Inventing the Universe, 1995 (1991 in French). This book
discusses the cosmology of Plato’s Timaeus, modern cosmology and AIT; one of their key
insights is to identify symmetry with simplicity.
According to Plato, the world is rationally understandable because it has
structure. And the universe has structure, because it is a work of art created by
a God who is a mathematician. Or, more abstractly, the structure of the world
consists of God’s thoughts, which are mathematical. The fabric of reality is built
out of eternal mathematical truth. [Brisson, Meyerstein, Inventer l’Univers,
1991]
Timaeus postulates that simple, symmetrical geometrical forms are the
building blocks for the universe: the circle and the regular solids (cube, tetra-
hedron, icosahedron, dodecahedron).
What was the evidence that convinced the ancient Greeks that the world
is comprehensible? Partly it was the beauty of mathematics, particularly ge-
ometry and number theory, and partly the Pythagorean work on the physics of
stringed instruments and musical tones, and in astronomy, the regularities in the
motions of the planets and the starry heavens and eclipses. Strangely enough,
mineral crystals, whose symmetries magnify enormously quantum-mechanical
symmetries that are found at the atomic and molecular level, are never men-
tioned.
What is our current cosmology?
Since the chaos of everyday existence provides little evidence of simplicity,
biology is based on chemistry is based on physics is based on high-energy or
particle physics. The attempt to find underlying simplicity and pattern leads
reductionist modern science to break things into smaller and smaller components
in an effort to find the underlying simple building blocks.
And the modern version of the cosmology of Timaeus is the application
of symmetries or group theory to understand sub-atomic particles (formerly
3See Menger, Reminiscences of the Vienna Circle and the Mathematical Colloquium, 1994.
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called elementary particles), for example, Gell-Mann’s eightfold way, which pre-
dicted new particles. This work classifying the “particle zoo” also resembles
Mendeleev’s periodic table of the elements that organizes their chemical prop-
erties so well.4
And modern physicists have also come up with a possible answer to the
Einstein quotation at the beginning of this paper. Why do they think that
the universe is comprehensible? They invoke the so-called “anthropic principle”
[Barrow, Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 1986], and declare that
we would not be here to ask this question unless the universe had enough order
for complicated creatures like us to evolve!
Now let’s proceed to the next major step in the evolution of ideas on sim-
plicity and complexity, which is a stronger version of the Platonic creed due to
Leibniz.
II What Does it Mean for the Universe to be
Intelligible? Leibniz’s Discussion of Simplicity,
Complexity and Lawlessness [Weyl 1932]
“As for the simplicity of the ways of God, this holds properly with respect to his means,
as opposed to the variety, richness, and abundance, which holds with respect to his ends or
effects.”
“But, when a rule is extremely complex, what is in conformity with it passes
for irregular. Thus, one can say, in whatever manner God might have created the world,
it would always have been regular and in accordance with a certain general order. But God
has chosen the most perfect world, that is, the one which is at the same time the
simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena, as might be a line in geometry
whose construction is easy and whose properties and effects are extremely remarkable and
widespread.”
—Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, 1686, Sections 5–6, from Leibniz, Philosophical
Essays, edited and translated by Ariew and Garber, 1989, pp. 38–39.
“The assertion that nature is governed by strict laws is devoid of all content if we do not
add the statement that it is governed by mathematically simple laws. . . That the notion of
law becomes empty when an arbitrary complication is permitted was already pointed
out by Leibniz in his Metaphysical Treatise [Discourse on Metaphysics]. Thus simplicity
becomes a working principle in the natural sciences. . . The astonishing thing is not that there
exist natural laws, but that the further the analysis proceeds, the finer the details, the finer the
elements to which the phenomena are reduced, the simpler—and not the more complicated,
as one would originally expect—the fundamental relations become and the more exactly do
they describe the actual occurrences. But this circumstance is apt to weaken the metaphysical
power of determinism, since it makes the meaning of natural law depend on the fluctuating
distinction between mathematically simple and complicated functions or classes of functions.”
—Hermann Weyl, The Open World, Three Lectures on the Metaphysical Implications of
Science, 1932, pp. 40–42. See a similar discussion on pp. 190–191 of Weyl, Philosophy of
Mathematics and Natural Science, 1949, Section 23A, “Causality and Law”.5
4For more on this, see the essay by Freeman Dyson on “Mathematics in the Physical
Sciences” in COSRIMS, The Mathematical Sciences, 1969. This is an article of his that was
originally published in Scientific American.
5This is a remarkable anticipation of my definition of “algorithmic randomness”, as a set
of observations that only has what Weyl considers to be unacceptable theories, ones that are
as complicated as the observations themselves, without any “compression”.
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“Weyl said, not long ago, that ‘the problem of simplicity is of central importance for the
epistemology of the natural sciences’. Yet it seems that interest in the problem has lately
declined; perhaps because, especially after Weyl’s penetrating analysis, there seemed to be so
little chance of solving it.”
—Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, 1949, p. 155, quoted in Popper,
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1959, Chapter VII, “Simplicity”, p. 136.
In his novel Candide, Voltaire ridiculed Leibniz, caricaturing Leibniz’s subtle
views with the memorable phrase “this is the best of all possible worlds”.
Voltaire also ridiculed the efforts of Maupertius to develop a physics in line with
Leibniz’s views, one based on a principle of least effort.
Nevertheless versions of least effort play a fundamental role in modern sci-
ence, starting with Fermat’s deduction of the laws for reflection and refraction
of light from a principle of least time. This continues with the Lagrangian for-
mulation of mechanics, stating that the actual motion minimizes the integral of
the difference between the potential and the kinetic energy. And least effort is
even important at the current frontiers, such as in Feynman’s path integral for-
mulation of quantum mechanics (electron waves) and quantum electrodynamics
(photons, electromagnetic field quanta).6
However, all this modern physics refers to versions of least effort, not to
ideas, not to information, and not to complexity—which are more closely con-
nected with Plato’s original emphasis on symmetry and intellectual simplicity
= intelligibility. An analogous situation occurs in theoretical computer science,
where work on computational complexity is usually focussed on time, not on the
complexity of ideas or information. Work on time complexity is of great prac-
tical value, but I believe that the complexity of ideas is of greater conceptual
significance. Yet another example of the effort/information divide is the fact
that I am interested in the irreducibility of ideas (see Sections V and VI), while
Stephen Wolfram (who is discussed later in this section) instead emphasizes
time irreducibility, physical systems for which there are no predictive short-cuts
and the fastest way to see what they do is just to run them.
Leibniz’s doctrine concerns more than “least effort”, it also implies that
the ideas that produce or govern this world are as beautiful and as simple as
possible. In more modern terms, God employed the smallest possible amount
of intellectual material to build the world, and the laws of physics are as simple
and as beautiful as they can be and allow us, intelligent beings, to evolve.7
The belief in this Leibnizean doctrine lies behind the continuing reductionist
efforts of high-energy physics (particle physics) to find the ultimate components
of reality. The continuing vitality of this Leibnizean doctrine also lies behind
astrophysicist John Barrow’s emphasis in his “Theories of Everything” essay on
finding the minimal TOE that explains the universe, a TOE that is as simple
6See the short discussion of minimum principles in Feynman, The Character of Physical
Law, 1965, Chapter 2, “The Relation of Mathematics to Physics”. For more information, see
The Feynman Lectures on Physics, 1963, Vol. 1, Chapter 26, “Optics: The Principle of Least
Time”, Vol. 2, Chapter 19, “The Principle of Least Action”.
7This is a kind of “anthropic principle”, the attempt to deduce things about the universe
from the fact that we are here and able to look at it.
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as possible, with no redundant elements (see Section VII below).
Important point: To say that the fundamental laws of physics must be
simple does not at all imply that it is easy or fast to deduce from them how
the world works, that it is quick to make predictions from the basic laws. The
apparent complexity of the world we live in—a phrase that is constantly repeated
in Wolfram, A New Kind of Science, 2002—then comes from the long deductive
path from the basic laws to the level of our experience.8 So again, I claim that
minimum information is more important than minimum time, which is why in
Section IV I do not care how long a minimum-size program takes to produce
its output, nor how much time it takes to calculate experimental data using a
scientific theory.
More on Wolfram: In A New Kind of Science, Wolfram reports on his
systematic computer search for simple rules with very complicated consequences,
very much in the spirit of Leibniz’s remarks above. First Wolfram amends
the Pythagorean insight that Number rules the universe to assert the primacy
of Algorithm, not Number. And those are discrete algorithms, it’s a digital
philosophy!9 Then Wolfram sets out to survey all possible worlds, at least all the
simple ones.10 Along the way he finds a lot of interesting stuff. For example,
Wolfram’s cellular automata rule 110 is a universal computer, an amazingly
simple one, that can carry out any computation. A New Kind of Science is
an attempt to discover the laws of the universe by pure thought, to search
systematically for God’s building blocks!
The limits of reductionism: In what sense can biology and psychology
be reduced to mathematics and physics?! This is indeed the acid test of a reduc-
tionist viewpoint! Historical contingency is often invoked here: life as “frozen
accidents” (mutations), not something fundamental [Wolfram, Gould]. Work on
artificial life (Alife) plus advances in robotics are particularly aggressive reduc-
tionist attempts. The normal way to “explain” life is evolution by natural selec-
tion, ignoring Darwin’s own sexual selection and symbiotic/cooperative views of
the origin of biological progress—new species—notably espoused by Lynn Mar-
gulis (“symbiogenesis”). Other problems with Darwinian gradualism: following
the DNA as software paradigm, small changes in DNA software can produce big
changes in organisms, and a good way to build this software is by trading useful
subroutines (this is called horizontal or lateral DNA transfer).11 In fact, there
is a lack of fossil evidence for many intermediate forms,12 which is evidence for
rapid production of new species (so-called “punctuated equilibrium”).
8It could also come from the complexity of the initial conditions, or from coin-tossing, i.e.,
randomness.
9That’s a term invented by Edward Fredkin, who has worked on related ideas.
10That’s why his book is so thick!
11This is how bacteria acquire immunity to antibiotics.
12Already noted by Darwin.
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III What do Working Scientists Think about Sim-
plicity and Complexity?
“Science itself, therefore, may be regarded as a minimal problem, consisting of the completest
possible presentment of facts with the least possible expenditure of thought. . . Those ideas
that hold good throughout the widest domains of research and that supplement the greatest
amount of experience, are the most scientific.”
—Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 1893, Chapter IV, Section IV, “The Economy
of Science”, reprinted in Newman, The World of Mathematics, 1956.
“Furthermore, the attitude that theoretical physics does not explain phenomena, but only
classifies and correlates, is today accepted by most theoretical physicists. This means that
the criterion of success for such a theory is simply whether it can, by a simple and elegant
classifying and correlating scheme, cover very many phenomena, which without this scheme
would seem complicated and heterogeneous, and whether the scheme even covers phenomena
which were not considered or even not known at the time when the scheme was evolved.
(These two latter statements express, of course, the unifying and the predicting power of a
theory.)”
—John von Neumann, “The Mathematician”, 1947, reprinted in Newman, The World of
Mathematics, 1956, and in Bro´dy, Va´mos, The Neumann Compendium, 1995.
“These fundamental concepts and postulates, which cannot be further reduced
logically, form the essential part of a theory, which reason cannot touch. It is
the grand object of all theory to make these irreducible elements as simple and
as few in number as possible. . . [As] the distance in thought between the fundamental
concepts and laws on the one side and, on the other, the conclusions which have to be brought
into relation with our experience grows larger and larger, the simpler the logical structure
becomes—that is to say, the smaller the number of logically independent conceptual elements
which are found necessary to support the structure.”
—Einstein, “On the Method of Theoretical Physics”, 1934, reprinted in Einstein, Ideas
and Opinions, 1954.
“The aim of science is, on the one hand, a comprehension, as complete as possible, of
the connection between the sense experiences in their totality, and, on the other hand, the
accomplishment of this aim by the use of a minimum of primary concepts and relations.
(Seeking as far as possible, logical unity in the world picture, i.e., paucity in logical elements.)”
“Physics constitutes a logical system of thought which is in a state of evolution, whose
basis cannot be distilled, as it were, from experience by an inductive method, but can only be
arrived at by free invention. . . Evolution is proceeding in the direction of increased simplicity
of the logical basis. In order further to approach this goal, we must resign to the fact that the
logical basis departs more and more from the facts of experience, and that the path of our
thought from the fundamental basis to those derived propositions, which correlate with sense
experiences, becomes continually harder and longer.”
—Einstein, “Physics and Reality”, 1936, reprinted in Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, 1954.
“[S]omething general will have to be said. . . about the points of view from which physical
theories may be analyzed critically. . . The first point of view is obvious: the theory must not
contradict empirical facts. . . The second point of view is not concerned with the relationship
to the observations but with the premises of the theory itself, with what may briefly but
vaguely be characterized as the ‘naturalness’ or ‘logical simplicity’ of the premises (the basic
concepts and the relations between these). . . We prize a theory more highly if, from the
logical standpoint, it does not involve an arbitrary choice among theories that are equivalent
and possess analogous structures. . . I must confess herewith that I cannot at this point, and
perhaps not at all, replace these hints by more precise definitions. I believe, however, that a
sharper formulation would be possible.”
—Einstein, “Autobiographical Notes”, originally published in Schilpp, Albert Einstein,
Philosopher-Scientist, 1949, and reprinted as a separate book in 1979.
“What, then, impels us to devise theory after theory? Why do we devise theories at
all? The answer to the latter question is simply: because we enjoy ‘comprehending,’
i.e., reducing phenomena by the process of logic to something already known or
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(apparently) evident. New theories are first of all necessary when we encounter new facts
which cannot be ‘explained’ by existing theories. But this motivation for setting up new
theories is, so to speak, trivial, imposed from without. There is another, more subtle motive
of no less importance. This is the striving toward unification and simplification of the premises
of the theory as a whole (i.e., Mach’s principle of economy, interpreted as a logical principle).”
“There exists a passion for comprehension, just as there exists a passion for music. That
passion is rather common in children, but gets lost in most people later on. Without this
passion, there would be neither mathematics nor natural science. Time and again the passion
for understanding has led to the illusion that man is able to comprehend the objective world
rationally, by pure thought, without any empirical foundations—in short, by metaphysics.
I believe that every true theorist is a kind of tamed metaphysicist, no matter how pure a
‘positivist’ he may fancy himself. The metaphysicist believes that the logically simple
is also the real. The tamed metaphysicist believes that not all that is logically
simple is embodied in experienced reality, but that the totality of all sensory
experience can be ‘comprehended’ on the basis of a conceptual system built on
premises of great simplicity. The skeptic will say that this is a ‘miracle creed.’ Admittedly
so, but it is a miracle creed which has been borne out to an amazing extent by the development
of science.”
—Einstein, “On the Generalized Theory of Gravitation”, 1950, reprinted in Einstein,
Ideas and Opinions, 1954.
“One of the most important things in this ‘guess—compute consequences—compare with
experiment’ business is to know when you are right. It is possible to know when you are
right way ahead of checking all the consequences. You can recognize truth by its beauty
and simplicity. It is always easy when you have made a guess, and done two or three little
calculations to make sure that it is not obviously wrong, to know that it is right. When you
get it right, it is obvious that it is right—at least if you have any experience—
because usually what happens is that more comes out than goes in. Your guess
is, in fact, that something is very simple. If you cannot see immediately that it is wrong,
and it is simpler than it was before, then it is right. The inexperienced, and crackpots, and
people like that, make guesses that are simple, but you can immediately see that they are
wrong, so that does not count. Others, the inexperienced students, make guesses that are
very complicated, and it sort of looks as if it is all right, but I know it is not true because the
truth always turns out to be simpler than you thought. What we need is imagination, but
imagination in a terrible strait-jacket. We have to find a new view of the world that has to
agree with everything that is known, but disagree in its predictions somewhere, otherwise it
is not interesting. And in that disagreement it must agree with nature. . . ”
—Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, 1965, Chapter 7, “Seeking New Laws”.
“It is natural that a man should consider the work of his hands or his brain to be useful
and important. Therefore nobody will object to an ardent experimentalist boasting of his
measurements and rather looking down on the ‘paper and ink’ physics of his theoretical friend,
who on his part is proud of his lofty ideas and despises the dirty fingers of the other. But in
recent years this kind of friendly rivalry has changed into something more serious. . . [A] school
of extreme experimentalists. . . has gone so far as to reject theory altogether. . . There is also a
movement in the opposite direction. . . claiming that to the mind well trained in mathematics
and epistemology the laws of Nature are manifest without appeal to experiment.”
“Given the knowledge and the penetrating brain of our mathematician, Maxwell’s equa-
tions are a result of pure thinking and the toil of experimenters antiquated and superfluous.
I need hardly explain to you the fallacy of this standpoint. It lies in the fact that none of the
notions used by the mathematicians, such as potential, vector potential, field vectors, Lorentz
transformations, quite apart from the principle of action itself, are evident or given a priori.
Even if an extremely gifted mathematician had constructed them to describe the properties of
a possible world, neither he nor anybody else would have had the slightest idea how to apply
them to the real world.”
“Charles Darwin, my predecessor in my Edinburgh chair, once said something like this:
‘The Ordinary Man can see a thing an inch in front of his nose; a few can see things 2 inches
distant; if anyone can see it at 3 inches, he is a man of genius.’ I have tried to describe to you
some of the acts of these 2- or 3-inch men. My admiration of them is not diminished by the
7
consciousness of the fact that they were guided by the experience of the whole human race to
the right place into which to poke their noses. I have also not endeavoured to analyse
the idea of beauty or perfection or simplicity of a natural law which has often guided
the correct divination. I am convinced that such an analysis would lead to nothing;
for these ideas are themselves subject to development. We learn something new
from every new case, and I am not inclined to accept final theories about invariable laws
of the human mind.”
“My advice to those who wish to learn the art of scientific prophecy is not to rely on
abstract reason, but to decipher the secret language of Nature from Nature’s documents, the
facts of experience.”
—Max Born, Experiment and Theory in Physics, 1943, pp. 1, 8, 34–35, 44.
These eloquent discussions of the role that simplicity and complexity play
in scientific discovery by these distinguished 20th century scientists show the
importance that they ascribe to these questions.
In my opinion, the fundamental point is this: The belief that the universe is
rational, lawful, is of no value if the laws are too complicated for us to compre-
hend, and is even meaningless if the laws are as complicated as our observations,
since the laws are then no simpler than the world they are supposed to explain.
As we saw in the previous section, this was emphasized (and attributed to Leib-
niz) by Hermann Weyl, a fine mathematician and mathematical physicist.
But perhaps we are overemphasizing the role that the notions of simplicity
and complexity play in science?
In his beautiful 1943 lecture published as a small book on Experiment and
Theory in Physics, the theoretical physicist Max Born criticized those who think
that we can understand Nature by pure thought, without hints from exper-
iments. In particular, he was referring to now forgotten and rather fanciful
theories put forth by Eddington and Milne. Now he might level these criticisms
at string theory and at Stephen Wolfram’s A New Kind of Science [Jacob T.
Schwartz, private communication].
Born has a point. Perhaps the universe is complicated, not simple! This
certainly seems to be the case in biology more than in physics. Then thought
alone is insufficient; we need empirical data. But simplicity certainly reflects
what we mean by understanding: understanding is compression. So perhaps
this is more about the human mind than it is about the universe. Perhaps our
emphasis on simplicity says more about us than it says about the universe!
Now we’ll try to capture some of the essential features of these philosophical
ideas in a mathematical theory.
IV A Mathematical Theory of Simplicity, Com-
plexity and Irreducibility: AIT
The basic idea of algorithmic information theory (AIT) is that a scientific theory
is a computer program, and the smaller, the more concise the program is, the
better the theory!
But the idea is actually much broader than that. The central idea of
algorithmic information theory is reflected in the belief that the fol-
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lowing diagrams all have something fundamental in common. In each
case, ask how much information we put in versus how much we get out. And
everything is digital, discrete.
Shannon information theory (communications engineering), noiseless coding:
encoded message → Decoder → original message
Model of scientific method:
scientific theory → Calculations → empirical/experimental data
Algorithmic information theory (AIT), definition of program-size complexity:
program→ Computer → output
Central dogma of molecular biology:
DNA → Embryogenesis/Development→ organism
(In this connection, see Ku¨ppers, Information and the Origin of Life, 1990.)
Turing/Post abstract formulation of a Hilbert-style formal axiomatic mathemat-
ical theory as a mechanical procedure for systematically deducing all possible
consequences from the axioms:
axioms → Deduction → theorems
Contemporary physicists’ efforts to find a Theory of Everything (TOE):
TOE → Calculations → Universe
Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, 1686:
Ideas →Mind of God → The World
In each case the left-hand side is smaller, much smaller, than the right-hand
side. In each case, the right-hand side can be constructed (re-constructed)
mechanically, or systematically, from the left-hand side. And in each case we
want to keep the right-hand side fixed while making the left-hand side as small
as possible. Once this is accomplished, we can use the size of the left-hand side
as a measure of the simplicity or the complexity of the corresponding right-hand
side.
Starting with this one simple idea, of looking at the size of computer pro-
grams, or at program-size complexity, you can develop a sophisticated, elegant
mathematical theory, AIT, as you can see in my four Springer-Verlag volumes
listed in the bibliography of this paper.
But, I must confess that AIT makes a large number of important hidden
assumptions! What are they?
Well, one important hidden assumption of AIT is that the choice of computer
or of computer programming language is not too important, that it does not
affect program-size complexity too much, in any fundamental way. This is
debatable.
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Another important tacit assumption: we use the discrete computation ap-
proach of Turing 1936, eschewing computations with “real” (infinite-precision)
numbers like pi = 3.1415926. . . which have an infinite number of digits when
written in decimal notation, but which correspond, from a geometrical point of
view, to a single point on a line, an elemental notion in continuous, but not
in discrete, mathematics. Is the universe discrete or continuous? Leibniz is
famous for his work on continuous mathematics. AIT sides with the discrete,
not with the continuous. [Franc¸oise Chaitin-Chatelin, private communication]
Also, in AIT we completely ignore the time taken by a computation, con-
centrating only on the size of the program. And the computation run-times
may be monstrously large, quite impracticably so, in fact, totally astronomical
in size. But trying to take time into account destroys AIT, an elegant, simple
theory of complexity, and one which imparts much intuitive understanding. So
I think that it is a mistake to try to take time into account when thinking about
this kind of complexity.
We’ve talked about simplicity and complexity, but what about irreducibil-
ity? Now let’s apply AIT to mathematical logic and obtain some limitative
metatheorems. However, following Turing 1936 and Post 1944, I’ll use the no-
tion of algorithm to deduce limits to formal reasoning, not Go¨del’s original 1931
approach. I’ll take the position that a Hilbert-style mathematical theory, a for-
mal axiomatic theory, is a mechanical procedure for systematically generating
all the theorems by running through all possible proofs, systematically deducing
all consequences of the axioms.13 Consider the size in bits of the algorithm for
doing this. This is how we measure the simplicity or complexity of the formal
axiomatic theory. It’s just another instance of program-size complexity!
But at this point, Chaitin-Chatelin insists, I should admit that we are making
an extremely embarrassing hidden assumption, which is that you can system-
atically run through all the proofs. This assumption, which is bundled into my
definition of a formal axiomatic theory, means that we are assuming that the
language of our theory is static, and that no new concepts can ever emerge.
But no human language or field of thought is static!14 And this idea of being
able to make a numbered list with all possible proofs was clearly anticipated by
E´mile Borel in 1927 when he pointed out that there is a real number with the
problematical property that its Nth digit after the decimal point gives us the
answer to the Nth yes/no question in French.15
Yes, I agree, a Hilbert-style formal axiomatic theory is indeed a fantasy, but
it is a fantasy that inspired many people, and one that even helped to lead to
the creation of modern programming languages. It is a fantasy that it is useful
to take seriously long enough for us to show in Section VI that even if you are
13In a way, this point of view was anticipated by Leibniz with his lingua characteristica
universalis.
14And computer programming languages aren’t static either, which can be quite a nuisance.
15Borel’s work was brought to my attention by Vladimir Tasic´ in his book Mathematics and
the Roots of Postmodern Thought, 2001, where he points out that in some ways it anticipates
the Ω number that I’ll discuss in Section IX. Borel’s paper is reprinted in Mancosu, From
Brouwer to Hilbert, 1998, pp. 296–300.
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willing to accept all these tacit assumptions, something else is terribly wrong.
Formal axiomatic theories can be criticized from within, as well as from without.
And it is far from clear how weakening these tacit assumptions would make it
easier to prove the irreducible mathematical truths that are exhibited in Section
VI.
And the idea of a fixed, static computer programming language in which you
write the computer programs whose size you measure is also a fantasy. Real
computer programming languages don’t stand still, they evolve, and the size of
the computer program you need to perform a given task can therefore change.
Mathematical models of the world like these are always approximations, “lies
that help us to see the truth” (Picasso). Nevertheless, if done properly, they
can impart insight and understanding, they can help us to comprehend, they
can reveal unexpected connections. . .
V From Computational Irreducibility to Logical
Irreducibility. Examples of Computational Irre-
ducibility: “Elegant” Programs
Our goal in this section and the next is to use AIT to establish the existence
of irreducible mathematical truths. What are they, and why are they
important?
Following Euclid’s Elements, a mathematical truth is established by reducing
it to simpler truths until self-evident truths—“axioms” or “postulates”16—are
reached. Here we exhibit an extremely large class of mathematical truths that
are not at all self-evident but which are not consequences of any principles
simpler than they are.
Irreducible truths are highly problematical for traditional philosophies of
mathematics, but as discussed in Section VIII, they can be accommodated in
an emerging “quasi-empirical” school of the foundations of mathematics, which
says that physics and mathematics are not that different.
Our path to logical irreducibility starts with computational irreducibility.
Let’s start by calling a computer program “elegant” if no smaller program in
the same language produces exactly the same output. There are lots of elegant
programs, at least one for each output. And it doesn’t matter how slow an
elegant program is, all that matters is that it be as small as possible.
An elegant program viewed as an object in its own right is computationally
irreducible. Why? Because otherwise you can get a more concise program for
its output by computing it first and then running it. Look at this diagram:
program2 → Computer → program1 → Computer → output
If program1 is as concise as possible, then program2 cannot be much more
concise than program1. Why? Well, consider a fixed-sized routine for running
a program and then immediately running its output. Then
16Atoms of thought!
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program2 + fixed-size routine → Computer → output
produces exactly the same output as program1 and would be a more concise
program for producing that output than program1 is. But this is impossible
because it contradicts our hypothesis that program1 was already as small as
possible. Q.E.D.
Why should elegant programs interest philosophers? Well, because of Oc-
cam’s razor, because the best theory to explain a fixed set of data is an elegant
program!
But how can we get irreducible truths? Well, just try proving that a pro-
gram is elegant!
VI Irreducible Mathematical Truths. Examples
of Logical Irreducibility: Proving a Program is
Elegant
Hauptsatz: You cannot prove that a program is elegant if its size is substan-
tially larger than the size of the algorithm for generating all the theorems in
your theory.
Proof: The basic idea is to run the first provably elegant program you
encounter when you systematically generate all the theorems, and that is sub-
stantially larger than the size of the algorithm for generating all the theorems.
Contradiction, unless no such theorem can be demonstrated, or unless the the-
orem is false.
Now I’ll explain why this works. We are given a formal axiomatic mathe-
matical theory:
theory = program→ Computer → set of all theorems
We may suppose that this theory is an elegant program, i.e., as concise as
possible for producing the set of theorems that it does. Then the size of this
program is by definition the complexity of the theory, since it is the size of
the smallest program for systematically generating the set of all the theorems,
which are all the consequences of the axioms. Now consider a fixed-size routine
with the property that
theory + fixed-size routine → Computer →
output of the first provably elegant program larger than
complexity of theory
More precisely,
theory + fixed-size routine → Computer →
output of the first provably elegant program larger than
(complexity of theory + size of the fixed-size routine)
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This proves our assertion that a mathematical theory cannot prove that a pro-
gram is elegant if that program is substantially larger than the complexity of
the theory.
Here is the proof of this result in more detail. The fixed-size routine knows
its own size and is given the theory, a computer program for generating theo-
rems, whose size it measures and which it then runs, until the first theorem is
encountered asserting that a particular program P is elegant that is larger than
the total input to the computer. The fixed-size routine then runs the program
P , and finally produces as output the same output as P produces. But this is
impossible, because the output from P cannot be obtained from a program that
is smaller than P is, not if, as we assume by hypothesis, all the theorems of the
theory are true and P is actually elegant. Therefore P cannot exist. In other
words, if there is a provably elegant program P whose size is greater than the
complexity of the theory + the size of this fixed-size routine, either P is actually
inelegant or we have a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Because no mathematical theory of finite complexity can enable you to de-
termine all the elegant programs, the following is immediate:
Corollary: The mathematical universe has infinite complexity.17
This strengthens Go¨del’s 1931 refutation of Hilbert’s belief that a single,
fixed formal axiomatic theory could capture all of mathematical truth.
Given the significance of this conclusion, it is natural to demand more infor-
mation. You’ll notice that I never said which computer programming language
I was using!
Well, you can actually carry out this proof using either high-level languages
such as the version of LISP that I use in The Unknowable, or using low-level
binary machine languages, such as the one that I use in The Limits of Mathemat-
ics. In the case of a high-level computer programming language, one measures
the size of a program in characters (or 8-bit bytes) of text. In the case of a
binary machine language, one measures the size of a program in 0/1 bits. My
proof works either way.
But I must confess that not all programming languages permit my proof to
work out this neatly. The ones that do are the kinds of programming languages
that you use in AIT, the ones for which program-size complexity has elegant
properties instead of messy ones, the ones that directly expose the fundamental
nature of this complexity concept (which is also called algorithmic information
content), not the programming languages that bury the basic idea in a mass of
messy technical details.
This paper started with philosophy, and then we developed a mathematical
theory. Now let’s go back to philosophy. In the last three sections of this paper
we’ll discuss the philosophical implications of AIT.
17On the other hand, our current mathematical theories are not very complex. On pages
773–774 of A New Kind of Science, Wolfram makes this point by exhibiting essentially all of
the axioms for traditional mathematics—in just two pages! However, a program to generate
all the theorems would be larger.
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VII Could We Ever Be Sure that We Had the
Ultimate TOE? [Barrow 1995]
“The search for a ‘Theory of Everything’ is the quest for an ultimate compression of the
world. Interestingly, Chaitin’s proof of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem using the concepts of
complexity and compression reveals that Go¨del’s theorem is equivalent to the fact that one
cannot prove a sequence to be incompressible. We can never prove a compression to be the
ultimate one; there might be a yet deeper and simpler unification waiting to be found.”
—John Barrow, essay on “Theories of Everything” in Cornwell, Nature’s Imagination,
1995, reprinted in Barrow, Between Inner Space and Outer Space, 1999.
Here is the first philosophical application of AIT. According to astrophysi-
cist John Barrow, my work implies that even if we had the optimum, perfect,
minimal (elegant!) TOE, we could never be sure a simpler theory would not
have the same explanatory power.
(“Explanatory power” is a pregnant phrase, and one can make a case that
it is a better name to use than the dangerous word “complexity”, which has
many other possible meanings. One could then speak of a theory with N bits
of algorithmic explanatory power, rather than describe it as a theory having a
program-size complexity of N bits. [Franc¸oise Chaitin-Chatelin, private com-
munication])
Well, you can dismiss Barrow by saying that the idea of having the ultimate
TOE is pretty crazy—who expects to be able to read the mind of God?! Ac-
tually, Wolfram believes that a systematic computer search might well find the
ultimate TOE.18 I hope he continues working on this project!
In fact, Wolfram thinks that he not only might be able to find the ultimate
TOE, he might even be able to show that it is the simplest possible TOE! How
does he escape the impact of my results? Why doesn’t Barrow’s observation
apply here?
First of all, Wolfram is not very interested in proofs, he prefers computa-
tional evidence. Second, Wolfram does not use program-size complexity as his
complexity measure. He uses much more down-to-earth complexity measures.
Third, he is concerned with extremely simple systems, while my methods apply
best to objects with high complexity.
Perhaps the best way to explain the difference is to say that he is looking at
“hardware” complexity, and I’m looking at “software” complexity. The objects
he studies have complexity less than or equal to that of a universal computer.
Those I study have complexity much larger than a universal computer. For
Wolfram, a universal computer is the maximum possible complexity, and for me
it is the minimum possible complexity.
Anyway, now let’s see what’s the message from AIT for the working mathe-
matician.
18See pages 465–471, 1024–1027 of A New Kind of Science.
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VIII Should Mathematics Be More Like Physics?
Must Mathematical Axioms Be Self-Evident?
“A deep but easily understandable problem about prime numbers is used in the following
to illustrate the parallelism between the heuristic reasoning of the mathematician and the
inductive reasoning of the physicist. . . [M]athematicians and physicists think alike; they are
led, and sometimes misled, by the same patterns of plausible reasoning.”
—George Po´lya, “Heuristic Reasoning in the Theory of Numbers”, 1959, reprinted in
Alexanderson, The Random Walks of George Po´lya, 2000.
“The role of heuristic arguments has not been acknowledged in the philosophy of mathe-
matics, despite the crucial role that they play in mathematical discovery. The mathematical
notion of proof is strikingly at variance with the notion of proof in other areas. . . Proofs given
by physicists do admit degrees: of two proofs given of the same assertion of physics, one may
be judged to be more correct than the other.”
—Gian-Carlo Rota, “The Phenomenology of Mathematical Proof”, 1997, reprinted in
Jacquette, Philosophy of Mathematics, 2002, and in Rota, Indiscrete Thoughts, 1997.
“There are two kinds of ways of looking at mathematics. . . the Babylonian tradition and
the Greek tradition. . . Euclid discovered that there was a way in which all the theorems of
geometry could be ordered from a set of axioms that were particularly simple. . . The Babylo-
nian attitude. . . is that you know all of the various theorems and many of the connections in
between, but you have never fully realized that it could all come up from a bunch of axioms. . .
[E]ven in mathematics you can start in different places. . . In physics we need the Babylonian
method, and not the Euclidian or Greek method.”
—Richard Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, 1965, Chapter 2, “The Relation of
Mathematics to Physics”.
“The physicist rightly dreads precise argument, since an argument which is only convincing
if precise loses all its force if the assumptions upon which it is based are slightly changed,
while an argument which is convincing though imprecise may well be stable under small
perturbations of its underlying axioms.”
—Jacob Schwartz, “The Pernicious Influence of Mathematics on Science”, 1960, reprinted
in Kac, Rota, Schwartz, Discrete Thoughts, 1992.
“It is impossible to discuss realism in logic without drawing in the empirical sciences. . .
A truly realistic mathematics should be conceived, in line with physics, as a branch of the
theoretical construction of the one real world and should adopt the same sober and cautious
attitude toward hypothetic extensions of its foundation as is exhibited by physics.”
—Hermann Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, 1949, Appendix A,
“Structure of Mathematics”, p. 235.
The above quotations are eloquent testimonials to the fact that although
mathematics and physics are different, maybe they are not that different! Ad-
mittedly, math organizes our mathematical experience, which is mental or com-
putational, and physics organizes our physical experience.19 They are certainly
not exactly the same, but maybe it’s a matter of degree, a continuum of possi-
bilities, and not an absolute, black and white difference.
Certainly, as both fields are currently practiced, there is a definite difference
in style. But that could change, and is to a certain extent a matter of fashion,
not a fundamental difference.
A good source of essays that I—but perhaps not the authors!—regard as gen-
erally supportive of the position that math be considered a branch of physics is
Tymoczko, New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 1998. In partic-
ular there you will find an essay by Lakatos giving the name “quasi-empirical”
19And in physics everything is an approximation, no equation is exact.
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to this view of the nature of the mathematical enterprise.
Why is my position on math “quasi-empirical”? Because, as far as I can see,
this is the only way to accommodate the existence of irreducible mathematical
facts gracefully. Physical postulates are never self-evident, they are justified
pragmatically, and so are close relatives of the not at all self-evident irreducible
mathematical facts that I exhibited in Section VI.
I’m not proposing that math is a branch of physics just to be controversial.
I was forced to do this against my will! This happened in spite of the fact
that I’m a mathematician and I love mathematics, and in spite of the fact
that I started with the traditional Platonist position shared by most working
mathematicians. I’m proposing this because I want mathematics to work better
and be more productive. Proofs are fine, but if you can’t find a proof, you
should go ahead using heuristic arguments and conjectures.
Wolfram’s A New Kind of Science also supports an experimental, quasi-
empirical way of doing mathematics. This is partly because Wolfram is a physi-
cist, partly because he believes that unprovable truths are the rule, not the
exception, and partly because he believes that our current mathematical theo-
ries are highly arbitrary and contingent. Indeed, his book may be regarded as a
very large chapter in experimental math. In fact, he had to develop his own pro-
gramming language, Mathematica, to be able to do the massive computations
that led him to his conjectures.
See also Tasic´,Mathematics and the Roots of Postmodern Thought, 2001, for
an interesting perspective on intuition versus formalism. This is a key question—
indeed in my opinion it’s an inescapable issue—in any discussion of how the
game of mathematics should be played. And it’s a question with which I, as a
working mathematician, am passionately concerned, because, as we discussed
in Section VI, formalism has severe limitations. Only intuition can enable us to
go forward and create new ideas and more powerful formalisms.
And what are the wellsprings of mathematical intuition and creativity? In
his important forthcoming book on creativity, Tor Nørretranders makes the
case that a peacock, an elegant, graceful woman, and a beautiful mathematical
theory, are all shaped by the same forces, namely what Darwin referred to as
“sexual selection”. Hopefully this book will be available soon in a language other
than Danish! Meanwhile, see my dialogue with him in my book Conversations
with a Mathematician.
Now, for our last topic, let’s look at the entire physical universe!
IX Is the Universe Like pi or Like Ω? Reason
versus Randomness! [Brisson, Meyerstein 1995]
“Parce qu’on manquait d’une de´finition rigoreuse de complexite´, celle qu’a propose´e la
TAI [the´orie algorithmique de l’information], confondre pi avec Ω a e´te´ plutoˆt la re`gle que
l’exception. Croire, parce que nous avons ici affaire a` une croyance, que toutes les suites,
puisqu’elles ne sont que l’enchaˆınement selon une re`gle rigoureuse de symboles de´termine´s,
peuvent toujours eˆtre comprime´es en quelque chose de plus simple, voila` la source de l’erreur
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du re´ductionnisme. Admettre la complexite´ a toujours paru insupportable aux philosophes,
car c’e´tait renoncer a` trouver un sens rationnel a` la vie des hommes.”
—Brisson, Meyerstein, Puissance et Limites de la Raison, 1995, “Postface. L’erreur du
re´ductionnisme”, p. 229.
First let me explain what the number Ω is. It’s the jewel in AIT’s crown, and
it’s a number that has attracted a great deal of attention, because it’s a very
dangerous number! Ω is defined to be the halting probability of what computer
scientists call a universal computer, or universal Turing machine.20 So Ω is a
probability and therefore it’s a real number, a number measured with infinite
precision, that’s between zero and one.21 That may not sound too dangerous!
What’s dangerous about Ω is that (a) it has a simple, straightforward math-
ematical definition, but at the same time (b) its numerical value is maximally
unknowable, because a formal mathematical theory whose program-size com-
plexity or explanatory power is N bits cannot enable you to determine more
than N bits of the base-two expansion of Ω! In other words, if you want to cal-
culate Ω, theories don’t help very much, since it takes N bits of theory to get N
bits of Ω. In fact, the base-two bits of Ω are maximally complex, there’s no re-
dundancy, and Ω is the prime example of how unadulterated infinite complexity
arises in pure mathematics!
How about pi = 3.1415926. . . the ratio of the circumference of a circle to
its diameter? Well, pi looks pretty complicated, pretty lawless. For example,
all its digits seem to be equally likely,22 although this has never been proven.23
If you are given a bunch of digits from deep inside the decimal expansion of
pi, and you aren’t told where they come from, there doesn’t seem to be any
redundancy, any pattern. But of course, according to AIT, pi in fact only has
finite complexity, because there are algorithms for calculating it with arbitrary
precision.24
Following Brisson, Meyerstein, Puissance et Limites de la Raison, 1995, let’s
now finally discuss whether the physical universe is like pi = 3.1415926. . . which
only has a finite complexity, namely the size of the smallest program to generate
pi, or like Ω, which has unadulterated infinite complexity. Which is it?!
Well, if you believe in quantum physics, then Nature plays dice, and that
generates complexity, an infinite amount of it, for example, as frozen accidents,
mutations that are preserved in our DNA. So at this time most scientists would
bet that the universe has infinite complexity, like Ω does. But then the world
is incomprehensible, or at least a large part of it will always remain so, the
20In fact, the precise value of Ω actually depends on the choice of computer, and in The
Limits of Mathematics I’ve done that, I’ve picked one out.
21It’s ironic that the star of a discrete theory is a real number! This illustrates the creative
tension between the continuous and the discrete.
22In any base all the digits of Ω are equally likely. This is called “Borel normality”. For a
proof, see my book Exploring Randomness. For the latest on Ω, see Calude, Information and
Randomness.
23Amazingly enough, there’s been some recent progress in this direction by Bailey and
Crandall.
24In fact, some terrific new ways to calculate pi have been discovered by Bailey, Borwein
and Plouffe. pi lives, it’s not a dead subject!
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accidental part, all those frozen accidents, the contingent part.
But some people still hope that the world has finite complexity like pi, it
just looks like it has high complexity. If so, then we might eventually be able
to comprehend everything, and there is an ultimate TOE! But then you have
to believe that quantum mechanics is wrong, as currently practiced, and that
all that quantum randomness is really only pseudo-randomness, like what
you find in the digits of pi. You have to believe that the world is actually
deterministic, even though our current scientific theories say that it isn’t!
I think Vienna physicist Karl Svozil feels that way [private communication;
see his Randomness & Undecidability in Physics, 1994]. I know Stephen Wol-
fram does, he says so in his book. Just take a look at the discussion of fluid
turbulence and of the second law of thermodynamics in A New Kind of Science.
Wolfram believes that very simple deterministic algorithms ultimately account
for all the apparent complexity we see around us, just like they do in pi.25 He
believes that the world looks very complicated, but is actually very simple.
There’s no randomness, there’s only pseudo-randomness. Then nothing is con-
tingent, everything is necessary, everything happens for a reason. [Leibniz!]
Who knows! Time will tell!
Or perhaps from inside this world we will never be able to tell the difference,
only an outside observer could do that [Svozil, private communication].
Postscript
Readers of this paper may enjoy the somewhat different perspective in my chap-
ter “Complexite´, logique et hasard” in Benkirane, La Complexite´. Leibniz is
there too.
In addition, see my Conversations with a Mathematician, a book on philoso-
phy disguised as a series of dialogues—not the first time that this has happened!
Last but not least, see Zwirn, Les Limites de la Connaissance, that also
supports the thesis that understanding is compression, and the masterful multi-
author two-volume work, Kurt Go¨del, Wahrheit & Beweisbarkeit, a treasure
trove of information about Go¨del’s life and work.
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